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Abstract 
High trading volume is a common phenomenon in global financial markets. The most prominent explanation of 
excess trading volume is overconfidence. High market returns make investors overconfident and as a 
consequence, these investors trade more subsequently. The aim of this paper is to check if investors in Karachi 
stock exchange suffer from the overconfidence bias. We construct VAR model and impulse response function to 
investigate the relationship between return and turnover, the presence of which can be considered as evidence of 
overconfidence. Our results suggest that investors are indeed overconfident in the Karachi stock exchange. 
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Introduction: 
There are some puzzles found on the financial markets, which previously could not be solved using the standard 
economic theory, we accounted for once overconfidence of investors was assumed. These issues include 
excessive trading volume. The fluctuations in stock market and trading volume are influenced by the flow of 
information. Traders keep a close eye on trading volume because it reflects the dynamic interplay between 
informed traders and uninformed traders who interact with each other in the marketplace in light of their own 
trading strategies and, ultimately, set market clearing prices. Trading volume is termed as the critical piece of 
information in the stock market because it either activates or deactivates the price movements. High trading 
volume is a common phenomenon in global financial markets. As one of the most influential financial markets in 
the world, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)’s average monthly turnover in 2010 was approximately 
100%. Excessive trading has been considered “the single most embarrassing fact to the standard finance 
paradigm” (DeBondt and Thaler, 1994). Since classic models cannot explain excessive trading, we resort to 
behavioral finance theory, which deviates from the assumption of rational agents.  
Many psychological and empirical studies in Finance have found that people are not always rational, and 
systematic cognitive biases will lead to deviations from inferences drawn by classic theory. In this paper our 
main emphasis is on overconfidence bias, which is considered as key success factor in trading puzzle in financial 
markets. The overconfidence effect is a well-established bias in which someone's subjective confidence in their 
judgments is reliably greater than their objective accuracy, especially when confidence is relatively high. 
Investor’s overconfidence has been discussed for many years by a lot of researchers in their security valuation 
and trading skills.  
This paper focuses on the close connection between trading volume and overconfidence. Considering data 
availability, we follow the paper of Statman et al. (2006), which takes turnover as a proxy for the level of 
overconfidence. Gervias and Odean’s (2001) paper provides the basic framework for Statman’s model: due to 
the self-attribution bias, high returns in a bull market will increase investors’ overconfidence. On the other hand, 
the close relation between overconfidence and trading volume has been verified by several studies. Since 
overconfident investors believe in their abilities and will act based on the information they obtain, trading 
volume is affected. Hence, if the current trading volume can be explained by the past market return, it can be 
considered as an evidence of overconfidence. Based on this lead-lag relationship, we will apply a market-wide 
VAR model to examine the existence of overconfidence.Previous empirical studies have shown the presence of 
investors’ overconfidence in many countries. In this paper, our objective is: 
1. To investigate whether the overconfidence effect exists in the Karachi Stock Exchange by 
testing the interaction between trading volume and market returns.   
2. To explore how strong the impact of overconfidence is on market returns. 
This study will take investor overconfidence to see whether Pakistani stock market’s returns are dependent on 
overconfidence of investors or whether returns themselves determine the trading volumes. This study will 
provide an insight into rationality of Pakistani investor. The findings can be used by investors to make trade 
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decisions at right. Moreover it is useful in understanding market behavior. This can provide valuable information 
for financial advisers educating clients and for asset managers developing trading strategies.  
In a fully rational market, stock prices would be determined according to valuation theory. Share price would 
reflect investor estimates of company fundamentals, as measured by the discounted value of expected future cash 
flows.  
We assume that stock markets for the most part are efficient in this fundamental sense. We also assume there are 
enough overconfident investors to systematically, but temporarily, bias the prices of individual stocks away from 
fundamental value. We define an overconfident investor as one who believes too strongly in his or her own 
assessments of a stock's fundamentals. If there are enough overconfident investors to affect the market, stock 
prices will partially ignore objective information or react too slowly to new information.   
But eventually prices do react. The disparity between reality and the beliefs of the overconfident investors will 
be too great, or go on too long. At that point, fundamentals reassert themselves, as expectations realign with 
reality. This realignment moves prices closer to fundamental values. We test the hypothesis that overconfidence 
is a pervasive trait of investors and see whether the bias found in Pakistani stock prices. 
Literature review: 
Overconfidence is one of the psychological factors known to affect our everyday life and also well documented. When people 
tend to think that they are better than they really are (Trivers, 1991). The psychology and behavioral science literature 
characterize people that behave as if they have more ability than they actually possess as being overconfident (e.g.,Campbell, 
Goodie, & Foster, 2004; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Yates, 1990). 
Investors who attribute past success to their skill and past failure to bad luck are likely to be overconfident. An investor who is 
overconfident will want to utilize his perceived superior ability to obtain large returns. Overconfidence causes investors to be 
too certain about their own abilities and not to weight the opinion of others sufficiently. Overconfident investors apparently 
believe that they have superior information, even when this is not actually the case. Thus, the overconfidence hypothesis 
predicts that such investors will trade more, resulting in reduced returns. Several studies consider the proposition that investor 
overconfidence generates the high trading volume observed in financial markets .Odean (1998) argues that the high level of 
trading volume is the most important effect of overconfidence. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) present empirical 
evidence for the US market and argue that trading volume is higher after high returns, as investment success increases the 
degree of overconfidence. Furthermore, (Barber and Odean, 2000) who claims that overconfident investors underreact to new 
information, or overweight the value of information, but they also hold unrealistic beliefs about how high their returns will be . 
These theoretical models predict that overconfident investors, because either they overestimate the precision of the information 
they have, or because they think they have above average investment skills, trade more than rational investors. Zeyuan and 
Shuman (2011) in their study concluded that both market turnover and market return are found to be autocorrelated. The 
response of market turnover to shocks in market return is stronger than the response in the opposite direction, which is 
consistent with overconfidence. Margarida and Victor (2012) examined that there is a strong and positive relationship between 
investment in information and intensity of trading in financial assets is sensitive to the sources of information used by investors. 
Moreover overconfident and non-overconfident investors do not rely on the same sources of information. According to 
Boussaidi.R (2013) investors who exhibit overconfidence overestimate the precision of their private signals and therefore trade 
excessively on the basis of these signals causing a return volatility. Salma and Ezzeddine (2009) in their study analyzed 
overconfidence hypothesis in the Tunisian market and found that past market returns affect trading activity and there is the 
contemporaneous significant positive relation between volume and volatility.  
Fayyaz and Khalid (2012) found significant positive response of turnover to market return shock. This response was persistent 
for quite a long time which confirms the presence of investor overconfidence. Salma and Ezzeddine (2007) examined the 
Tunisian market and found that investors tend to be overconfident in general cases. In terms of investment, it is difficult for 
overconfident investors to beat their peers than to beat the market as a whole. Furthermore, age and income are not 
significantly related to self-confidence. Finally they concluded that men are more confident than women in general cases and in 
beating the market. 
 Beenish and Naeem (2013) in their study indicated that over confidence of the investors do not account for the risk associated 
with the return of the security and volumes are not impacted by return’s volatility. Markus and Martin (2007) have concluded 
in their study that those people having more skills of investment trade more but this thing does not matter either they have 
better past performance or not. It is indicated in the results of Dennis et al. (2005) that the less accurate their investment 
decisions are the more horizontal are participants to exhibit overconfidence. It is also observed that during one of two 
experiments (i) those participants who believe that their life is largely controlled by external factors are less often classified as 
overconfident, whereas (ii) males are less flat to overconfidence than females. At the end it is also noted that age is positively 
correlated with overconfidence. Gina and Liangpeng (2009) analyze that future trade performance of investors is positively 
affected by their previously-demonstrated trading ability which substitutes for private signal precision and is inferred from their 
prior purchases’ subsequent performance. Joshua and Jack (1999) test that systematic difference between confidence and 
accuracy, including an overall bias toward overconfidence. They also analysed stable individual differences determining why 
some people, domains and types of judgments are more flat to overconfidence will be important to understand the ways of 
making confidence judgments. Zhou.D (2011) in his study concluded that overconfidence of the market maker intensifies the 
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aggressiveness of informed trading on the private and public information, leading to an increased insider profit, and a more 
efficient and more stable market. 
Markus and Martin (2009) exhibit in their study that trading volume of an investor is affected by past market return and past 
portfolio returns. Investor follows the theory of more risk, more return in which he want to attain high risk stocks and reduce 
the stocks in its portfolio. It is also found that high past market returns do not lead to higher risk taking or reducing 
diversification. Yenshan and Cheng (2010) have analysed that there exists a significant positive relationship between investor 
behaviour and investment performance in its first few auctions but there comes a gradual decline in their returns from 
subsequent auctions. Such type pattern is also displayed in the dollar returns of these frequent bidders. It is also concluded that 
the results are consistent with the theory on the prediction of overconfidence that frequent bidders will under-perform 
infrequent bidders. There is a significant negative relationship between overconfidence and trading performance and result 
indicates that trader in an interactive environment is more overconfident and their performance is approximately poorer than 
traders in an isolated environment Phillip (2007). Gongmeng et al. (2007) concluded in their study that Chinese investors are 
suffering following three types of biases (i) they predisposed to sell stocks that have appreciated in their prices while not those 
that have depreciated in their prices (disposition effect) acknowledging gains not losses; (ii) they are being overconfident; and 
(iii) they consider that the past returns are signals of future returns (a representative bias). 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investors are overconfident, so current trading activity is positively related to past market returns. 
Hypothesis 2: Excessive trading of overconfident traders in stocks positively contributes to the observed returns 
volatility 
Data and methodology: 
Our database consists of monthly observations of Karachi stock exchange from January 2002 to December 2012. 
We use monthly observations for trading volume and returns, but our estimate of volatility is constrained by the 
availability of daily returns. We focus on monthly observations under the perspective that changes ininvestor 
overconfidence occur over monthly or annual horizons: 
Definition of Variables 
 mret : the monthly stock market return 
 mturn : the monthly volume (shares traded). 
 vol : the monthly temporal volatility of market return based on daily market returns within the month 
 
Empirical Methodology 
Following Statman and al. (2006), we use a vector autoregressive (VAR) and impulse response functions in 
order to study the interaction between market returns and trading proxies 
(Volume).We uses the following form of the VAR model: 
 
 Yt : a (nx1) vector of endogenous variables (return and trading proxy : turnover and volume). 
 Xt : a (nx1) vector of exogenous variable :volatility. 
 : a (nx1) residual vector. It captures the contemporaneous correlation between endogenous 
variables. 
 Ak : the matrix that measures how trading proxy and returns react to their lags. 
 BL : the matrix that measure how trading proxy and returns react to month (t-1) realizations of 
exogenous variables. 
 K et L: numbers of endogenous and exogenous observations. K and L are chosen based on the 
Akaike (1974) (AIC) and Schwartz (SIC) information criteria. 
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Results and discussion: 
Descriptive analysis: 
Table 1 
  
M RETURN 
 
MTURN 
 
VOL 
 Mean  0.019592  7.835276  0.012426 
 Median  0.021201  8.223179  0.011038 
 Maximum  0.241106  9.644660  0.034285 
 Minimum -0.448796  0.989541  7.55E-05 
 Std. Dev.  0.082542  1.397346  0.006736 
 Skewness -1.518837 -2.163459  1.063875 
 Kurtosis  10.27793  8.516456  4.020211 
Jarque-Bera  342.0768  270.3443  30.62485 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  2.586198  1034.256  1.640193 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.892532  255.7876  0.005943 
 Observations  132  132  132 
The table 1 provides descriptive statistics statistics on monthly market return and market trading as well as  
market-wide based control variable: volatility , during the period 2002-2012 
Unit Root Test: 
Before analysis and applying model to the data, this paper adopts Augmented Dickey Fuller (1979) test and 
Phillips-Perron test (1988) to ensure that every variable is under stationary. In these tests, the null hypothesis is 
that a series is nonstationary  Table 2 shows that the null hypothesis that the stock return series trading volume 
series and volatility series are nonstationary (i.e., have a unit root) is rejected for stock returns ,trading volume 
and volatility series. This confirms that both trading volume stock returns and volatility series are stationary and 
are, therefore, useful for further statistical analysis. 
Table 2 
Variables ADF  Test  prob.* P.P Test  prob.* :Nonstationarity 
M TURN 0.0138 0.0109 Rejected 
MRETURN 0.0000 0.0000 Rejected 
VOL 0.0000 0.0000 Rejected 
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: 
Optimal lag of exogenous variable is very important in VAR analysis. We will us Akike information criteria to 
find optimal lag of exogenous variables. This will be done by conducting VA R at different level of lags and the 
level which provides lowest score for above criterion will be used as lag value for endogenous variables 
Table 3 
     
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -60.08319 NA   0.009637  1.033600  1.124577  1.070557 
1  15.72968  146.7346  0.003026 -0.124672   0.057281*  -0.050758* 
2  18.28506  4.863460  0.003098 -0.101372  0.171559  0.009499 
3  24.81949  12.22571  0.002975 -0.142250  0.221658  0.005578 
4  32.62590   14.35373*   0.002798*  -0.203644*  0.251241 -0.018859 
5  34.63481  3.628990  0.002891 -0.171529  0.374332  0.050212 
6  37.68404  5.409928  0.002938 -0.156194  0.480644  0.102504 
7  42.22525  7.910505  0.002915 -0.164923  0.562891  0.130732 
8  42.85247  1.072339  0.003082 -0.110524  0.708268  0.222089 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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Endogenous variables: MTURN MRETURN ,  Exogenous variables: C VOL 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Table 4  
 
   
   
 MTURN MRETURN 
   
   MTURN(-1)  0.930834  0.023114 
  (0.09228)  (0.00837) 
 [ 10.0868] [ 2.76196] 
   
MTURN(-2) -0.272620  0.011745 
  (0.12689)  (0.01151) 
 [-2.14855] [ 1.02068] 
   
MTURN(-3)  0.115859  0.007095 
  (0.12917)  (0.01171) 
 [ 0.89698] [ 0.60573] 
   
MTURN(-4)  0.042805 -0.030771 
  (0.09565)  (0.00867) 
 [ 0.44751] [-3.54737] 
   
MRETURN(-1)  1.732692 -0.029804 
  (0.87920)  (0.07973) 
 [ 1.97076] [-0.37381] 
   
MRETURN(-2) -0.341871 -0.058846 
  (0.85095)  (0.07717) 
 [-0.40175] [-0.76256] 
   
MRETURN(-3)  1.109384 -0.064013 
  (0.84824)  (0.07692) 
 [ 1.30787] [-0.83216] 
   
MRETURN(-4) -0.479139  0.100311 
  (0.81521)  (0.07393) 
 [-0.58775] [ 1.35687] 
   
C  0.985427  0.008014 
  (0.45942)  (0.04166) 
 [ 2.14492] [ 0.19236] 
   
VOL  31.54807 -6.180575 
  (10.6109)  (0.96227) 
 [ 2.97316] [-6.42294] 
   
   
   
The results of the VAR conclude that turnover is in high correlation with its previous value. Thus yesterdays 
turnover has impact on today’s turnover. This indicates that investor overconfidence keeps the turnover at higher 
level .Further it is observed that return volatility has significant impact on returns and turnover. This may 
indicate that over confidence of the investors donot account for the risk associated with the return of the security.  
The second parts of these results indicate that previous days returns have significant positive impact on today’s 
turnover. However no evidence is found of the correlation between returns and turnover in later period. The 
significance of returns on turnover indicates that lag of returns determine the turnover in market. This indicates 
that previous day’s return determines to today turnover. This result is consistent with overconfidence hypothesis 
as high market returns make 
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the investors overconfident in the sense that they underestimate the variance of stock returns. The results also 
confirm that Pakistani stock market investors have imperfect knowledge of the market and perfect market 
hypothesis does not hold. 
Granger Causality Tests: 
Table 6 
 
Lags: 4   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 MTURN does not Granger Cause MRETURN  128  4.26343 0.0029 
 MRETURN does not Granger Cause MTURN  0.67413 0.6112 
    
    
 
The first null hypothesis is rejected as it p values less than .05 and F-stat is 4.26.Thus granger test reveal that 
turnover has impact on return. These finding implies that in the presence of current and past return trading 
volume add some predictive power for future return in Karachi stock exchange. These results agree with some 
theoretical model that implies information content of volume for future return and on the basis of such 
asymmetric information overconfidence investor trade more. However, this relationship doesn’t hold in the 
opposite way because the second null hypothesis is accepted because it has p values  more than .05 and F-stat  
0.67.Thus we could not see the influence of past market return on the trading volume in the Granger causality 
test. 
 
Impulse response analysis: 
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Figure 1 indicates a large and persistent response in mturn to mturn shock. Figure 2 indicates the shock of 
mreturn (impulse) on mturn (Response). The graph indicates that mturn are impacted by returns and the shock of 
mreturn impacts them but they stay in positive territory. This indicates that investors do react to shocks in returns 
but their overconfidence, translated in terms of turnover, will keep volumes in positive territory. Figure 3 
indicates that future returns are affected by change in turnover in Pakistan. The line is in the positive territory 
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with upward trend up to four months and then on the negative side. Figure 4 indicates the impact of 1 SD 
deviation movement (upward) of mreturn on mreturn. The graph indicates that return are positive in the 
beginning but then start landing in negative territory by eventually getting equal to zero. 
Conclusion: 
In this study, we analyze the overconfidence hypothesis in the Karachi stock exchange using vector 
autoregressive (VAR) and associated impulse response functions (IRF). One implication of overconfidence 
theory says that overconfident investors trade more aggressively. Assuming that past returns lead investors to 
become overconfident, we tested the hypothesis that turnover was positively related to past returns. Another 
implication of theory is that trading by overconfident investors contributes to the returns volatility. Accordingly, 
we tested the hypothesis that returns volatility is positively associated with overconfidence related turnover. 
Here we find past market returns affect turnover in VAR and significant positive response of turnover to market 
return shock in IRF. This response was persistent for quite a long time for monthly IRF. Thus, results confirm 
the presence of investor overconfidence at KSE. This is the key finding of this study. 
For the second hypothesis consistent with previous studies, we also found significant contemporaneous positive 
relationship between turnover and returns volatility in our VAR analysis. The predictability of security returns 
based on lagged volume has been documented by many financial economists as a possible violation of strict 
market efficiency. 
Due to time, data constraints we took monthly data for our analysis. However future study may be conducted by 
taking daily data of market and conducting VAR analysis. We have taken only volatility as control variable; 
other variable like dispersion can be taken for analysis. 
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“Knowledge is power. Information is power. The secreting or holding of knowledge or information may be an 
act of tyranny camouflaged as humility.”  
BEST OF LUCK 
 
 
 
 
 
